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JUVENILE JUSTICE AND WAIVER IN INDIANA:
A NEW LOOK AT AN OLD PROBLEM
INTRODUCTION
Although serious juvenile crime is not a recent phenomenon, its
frequency of occurence has drawn national attention. In fact, per-
sons under eighteen years of age committed twenty percent of all
serious crime during 1978.1 Statistics also indicate that juvenile
crime will have serious implications on American society in the
future if the percentage of serious juvenile crime continues to in-
crease at the rate it has over the past ten years.2 To reverse this
trend, juvenile crime should be confronted with a new attitude
toward treating the juvenile accused of a serious offense.
The traditional treatment of accused juveniles is to process the
child through a separate judicial system known as juvenile court.'
This court views the accused juvenile as a wayward child who needs
help and guidance.' The juvenile court seeks to "help the child, and
not punish him";5 rehabilitation, not retribution is its main gaol.8 Ac-
1. Nationwide in 1979, 20.1% of all serious violent crime was committed by
persons under eighteen years of age. These offenses included murder and nonnegligent
manslaughter, forcible rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, larceny-theft,
motor vehicle theft, and arson. The trend analysis shows an increase of 17% of
juvenile crime from 1970 to 1979. The individual trend breakdown is as follows:
Murder and nonnegligent manslaughter down 5.5%
Forcible Rape up 15.2%
Robbery up 32.7%/
Aggravated Assault up 59.7%
Burglary up 21.2%
Larceny-theft up 19.5%
Motor vehicle theft down 20.2%
Arson up 33.3%
United States Department of Justice, FBI Uniform Crime Reports 190, 196 (1980).
2. Id.
3. See Note, Waiver of Juvenile Jurisdiction and The Hard-Core Youth, 51
N.D.L. REV. 655, 656 (1974-75) [hereinafter referred to as Hard-Core Youth]. The first
juvenile court system was introduced in Illinois in 1899. Law of July 1, 1899 §§ 1-21
(1899), 11. Laws 131-37. This note described the juvenile justice systems as "more than
just another judicial body; it is another system of justice with different procedures, a
different penalty structure, and a different philosophy than adult court."
4. Comment, Rehabilitation as the Justification of Separate Juvenile Justice
System, 64 CAL. L. REV. 984 (1976) [hereinafter referred to as Rehabilitation as a
Justification].
5. Note, Waiver in Indiana-A Conflict with the Goals of the Juvenile
Justice System, 53 IND. L.J. 601 (1977-78) [hereinafter referred to as Waiver in In-
diana].
6. Id. at 601.
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cused juveniles are seen by the court as being particularly amenable
to rehabilitation because of the juvenile's age and impressionability.7
The juvenile court bases its actions on a theory of philosophy known
as the doctrine of "parens patriae."8
The individual states readily accepted a judicial process which
catered to the needs of the juvenile? In fact, every state legislature
has enacted, by statute, a separate juvenile justice system.0 These
court systems have exclusive jurisdiction over the juvenile accused
of a criminal offense.1 The lawmakers, however, also recognized that
7. Rehabilitation as a Justification, supra note 4, at 984.
8. Waiver in Indiana, supra note 5, at 601. According to Black's Law Dic-
tionary 49 (5th ed. 1979), parens patriae is defined as "father or parent of his country;
the sovereign power of guardianship over persons under disability; such as insane and
incompetent persons." Juveniles are considered persons under disability and as such
need the guidance and protection of the juvenile court system. In fact, early Indiana
law required the juvenile court judge to be a parent and at least forty years of age.
Chapter 237, Section 1, Indiana General Law 1903.
9. All fifty states and the District of Columbia have separate justice systems
for juveniles and adults. The respective statutes are: ALA. CODE § 12-15-34 (Supp.
1981); ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.060 (1979); ARIZ. CONST. art. 6 § 15 (1978); ARK. STAT. ANN.
§ 45-420 (1975); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 606 (West 1981); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-1-104(A)
(Supp. 1980); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-126 (Supp. 1981); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10 § 938
(Supp. 1980); D.C. CODE ENCYCL. § 11-1553 (West 1979); FLA. STAT. § 39.09 (Supp. 1981);
GA. CODE ANN. § 24A-2501 (1981); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 571-22 (1980); IDAHO CODE
§ 16-1806 (Supp. 1981); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 37, § 702-7(3) (Supp. 1981); IND. CODE § 31-6-2-4
(1981); IOWA CODE § 232.72 (Supp. 1980); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-808 (Supp. 1980); Ky.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 208.170 (Baldwin 1980); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13.1571.1 (West
Supp. 1981); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15 § 3101 (1981); MD. FAM. LAW CODE ANN.
§ 3-817 (1981); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119 § 61 (West 1981); MICH. CoMP. LAWS
ANN. § 764.27 (1981); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260.125 (West Supp. 1981); Miss. CODE ANN.
§ 43-21-31 (1972); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 211.071 (Vernon Supp. 1981); MONT. REV. CODES ANN.
§ 41-5-206 (1979); NEV. REV. STAT. § 62.080 (1979); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 169-B-24 (1979);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:4-48 (Supp. 1981); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 13-14-27-27.1 (1978); N.Y.
CRIM. PROC. LAW § 180.75, 190.71, 220.10, 310.85, and 330.25 (McKinney 1975); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 7A-280 (1980); N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-34 (1979); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.26
(Page 1979); OKLA. STAT. tit. 10 § 1112 (1981); OR. REV. STAT. § 419.533 (1979); PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 42 § 6355 (Purdon 1981); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 14-1-7 (Supp. 1980); S.C. CODE
§ 14-21-510 (Supp. 1980); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 26-8-22.7 (1976); TENN. CODE ANN. §
37-234 (Supp. 1981); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 2338-1 (Vernon 1980); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 78-3a-25 (1981); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33 § 635(a) (1981); VA. CODE § 16.1-269 (1981);
WASH. REV. CODE § 13.04.110 (1981); W. VA. CODE § 49-5-10 (1981); WIS. STAT. § 48.18
(1981); and WYO, STAT. § 14-9-104 (1977).
10. Id.
11. The United States Supreme Court in Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541,
556 (1966), stated "The Juvenile Court is vested with 'original and exclusive jurisdiction'
of the child." However, the juvenile court may lose jurisdiction depending on the age of
the accused juvenile or offense he is charged with. This exact age or offense charged
with differs among the states. See infra notes 38-49 and accompanying text.
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not every child would be rehabilitated under the juvenile justice
system.'" For that reason, nearly every state has enacted provisions
under which a youth can be prosecuted in adult court." This excep-
tion to exclusive jurisdiction over the juvenile is known as waiver."
Waiver enables the prosecutor to try the juvenile in adult
court, a court of unlimited jurisdiction. 5 In theory, the juvenile is
waived to adult court in order to serve the best interests of both
the juvenile and society. 6 The appropriateness of waiver is decided
on a case-by-case basis. 7
To be certain that the juvenile is given his constitutionally pro-
tected right of due process, 8 the legislatures of each state, 9 as well
as the United States Supreme Court,' have established procedural
guidelines to be followed by the juvenile court judge in the waiver
proceedings." Failure to abide by these guidelines is a violation
of the due process right of the juvenile and could result in the re-
lease of a convicted felon from custody.22 Thus, it is "critically
12. See Waiver in Indiana, supra note 5, at 601.
13. At the present time, only New York and Nebraska do not have traditional
judicial waiver provisions in their Juvenile Codes. For an explanation of judicial
waiver, see infra notes 69-73 and accompanying text.
14. IND. CODE § 31-6-2-4(a) (1981), defines waiver as "... an order of the juve-
nile court that waives the case to a court that would have jurisdiction had the act been
committed by an adult." Some states designate the process as "waiver," others
"transfer," and still others as "certification." For purposes of uniformity and clarity
this process will be labeled as "waiver" throughout this note.
15. The juvenile court is a court of limited jurisdiction. Once the juvenile
reaches the maximum age of the state's juvenile court jurisdiction, he must be set
free. For the corresponding State statutes, see supra note 9.
16. One author stated this theory as follows: "The criteria should adequately
reflect not only the interests of the community, but also fairness to the troubled youth
and consideration for his needs." Peuler, Juveniles Tried as Adults: Waiver of Juve-
nile Court Jurisdiction, 3 J. CONTEMP. L. 349, 358 (1977).
17. Whether a youth is waived or not is based on the individual facts of the
case. The United States Supreme Court set forth determinative factors to be used as
guidelines in deciding whether or not waiver is warranted. See infra note 42.
18. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
19. For the applicable statutes, see supra note 9.
20. For the determinative guidelines for the waiver process, see infra note 42.
21. The procedural guidelines are applicable to the judicial method of waiver
only. Judicial waiver is defined in infra notes 69-73 and accompanying text.
22. In many instances, when the judicial process finally decides that a juvenile
has been improperly waived from the juvenile court, he is now beyond the jurisdiction
of the juvenile court. Further, since he was a juvenile when initially charged, he can-
not be subjected to the jurisdiction of the adult court until properly waived. Hence,
although the juvenile was convicted, he must be set free since he was not properly
waived. For example, in Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966), the Supreme Court
1983]
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important"'  that the juvenile is waived in accordance with the
established guidelines.
Although each state has its own unique waiver statute, each
statute can be classified under one of four main categories: judicial,
legislative, prosecutorial, and hybrid. The judicial method of waiver
is used by the majority of the states and is the traditional method of
waiver. 4 Legislative and prosecutorial methods of waiver are
relatively new and have been enacted to side-step the procedural
guidelines associated with the judicial method of waiver.25 The
fourth classification of waiver, the hybrid waiver statute, combines
one or more of the pure methods of waiver.' For example, a hybrid
waiver statute may subject one class of accused juveniles to prose-
cutorial waiver while another class is subject to judicial waiver. The
hybrid waiver statute seems to be the preferred statute for those
states recently amending their waiver provisions."
Prior to 1981, waiver in Indiana could only be achieved through
the judicial method of waiver.' The waiver proceeding commenced
ultimately decided that the defendant had been improperly waived. Kent was already
21 years of age and beyond the jurisdiction of the juvenile court. Hence, the investiga-
tion was dismissed and Kent was freed. A caveat in this case, however, was that Kent
was adjudged insane in his rape prosecution. As such, after the charges were dismissed,
the State initiated incompetency proceedings against Kent and he was subsequently
confined for psychiatric treatment. Id. at 564. See infra note 38.
23. "Critically important" is an often cited phrase in reference to juvenile
waiver. The phrase was first coined in Kent. "It is clear beyond dispute that the
waiver of jurisdiction is a 'critically important' action determining vitally important
statutory rights of the juvenile." 383 U.S. at 556.
24. See generally Schornhorts, The Waiver of Juvenile Court Jurisdiction.
Kent Revisited, 43 IND. L.J. 583, 596 (1967-68) 1hereinafter referred to as Kent
Revisited].
25. Id. at 596, 598.
26. For a discussion of the pure methods of waiver, see infra notes 69-73,
86-92, and 102-107 and accompanying text.
27. Indiana and Vermont both enacted hybrid waiver statutes in 1981. The
statutes are IND. CODE § 31-6-1-4 (1981); and VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33 635(a) (1981). These
statutes are analyzed infra notes 112-117, 119-155 and accompanying text.
28. IND. CODE § 31-6-2-4 (1980) stated:
"Waiver of jurisdiction by juvenile court. -
(a) Waiver of jurisdiction refers to an order of the juvenile court that
waives the case to a court that would have jurisdiction had the act been
committed by an adult. Waiver is for the offense charged and all included
offenses.
(b) Upon motion of the prosecutor and after full investigation and hear-
ing, the juvenile court may waive jurisdiction if it finds that:
(1) The child is charged with an act:
(A) that is heinous or aggravated, with greater weight
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 17, No. 4 [1983], Art. 9
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upon a motion of the prosecutor, accompanied by a full investigation
and hearing, after which the juvenile court could waive jurisdic-
tion.' With the passage of Public Law 266,' juveniles charged with
given to acts against the person than to acts against
property; or
(B) That is a part of a repetitive pattern of delinquent
acts, even though less serious;
(2) The child was fourteen [141 years of age or older when
the act charged was allegedly committed;
(3) There is probable cause to believe that the child com-
mitted the act;
(4) The child is beyond rehabilitation under the juvenile
justice system; and
(5) It is in the best interests of the safety and welfare of
the community that he stand trial as an adult.
(c) Upon motion of the prosecutor and after full investigation and hear-
ing, the juvenile court shall waive jurisdiction if it finds that:
(1) The child is charged with an act that would be murder
if committed by an adult;
(2) There is probable cause to believe that the child has
committed the act; and
(3) The child was ten [10] years of age or older when the
act charged was allegedly committed; unless it would be in
the best interests of the child and of the safety and welfare
of the community for him to remain within the juvenile jus-
tice system
(d) Upon motion of the prosecutor and after full investigation and hear-
ing, the juvenile court shall waive jurisdiction if it finds that:
(1) The child is charged with an act that, if committed by
an adult, would be:
(A) A class A or class B felony, except a felony
defined by IC 35-48-4 [35-48-4-1 ---35-48-4-14];
(B) Involuntary manslaughter as a class C
felony under IC 35-42-1-5;
(2) There is probable cause to believe that the child has
committed the act; and
(3) The child was sixteen [16] years of age or older when
the act charged was allegedly committed; unless it would be
in the best interests of the child and of the safety and wel-
fare of the community for him to remain within the juvenile
justice system."
29. Id.
30. Public Law 266 is now IND. CODE § 31-6-2-4 (1981).
"Waiver of jurisdiction by juvenile court. ---
(a) Waiver of jurisdiction refers to an order of the juvenile court that
waives the case to a court that would have jurisdiction had the act been
committed by an adult. Waiver is for the offense charged and all included
offenses.
(b) Upon motion of the prosecutor and after full investigation and hear-
ing, the juvenile court may waive jurisdiction if it finds that:
1983]
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(1) The child is charged with an act:
(A) That is heinous or aggravated, with greater
weight given to acts against the person than to acts
against property; or
(B) That is a part of a repetitive pattern of delinqu-
ent acts, even though less serious;
(2) The child was fourteen [14] years of age or older when
the act charged was allegedly committed;
(3) There is probable cause to believe that the child com-
mitted the act;
(4) The child is beyond rehabilitation under the juvenile
justice system; and
(5) It is in the best interests of the safety and welfare of
the community he stand trial as an adult.
(c) Upon motion of the prosecutor and after full investigation and hear-
ing, the juvenile court shall waive jurisdiction if it finds that:
(1) The child is charged with an act that would be murder
if committed by an adult;
(2) There is probable cause to believe that the child has
committed the act; and
(3) The child was ten [10] years of age or older when the
act charged was allegedly committed; unless it would be in
the best interest of the child and of the safety and welfare of
the community for him to remain within the juvenile justice
system.
(d) Except for those cases in which the juvenile court has no jurisdiction
in accordance with section 1(d) [31-6-2-1(d)] of this chapter, the court shall,
upon motion of the prosecutor and after full investigation and hearing,
waive jurisdiction if it finds that:
(1) The child is charged with an act that, if committed by
an adult, would be:
(A) A class A or class B felony, except a felony de-
fined by IC 35-48-4 [35-48-4-1-35-48-4-14];
(B) Involuntary manslaughter as a class C felony
under IC 35-42-1-4; or
(C) Reckless homicide as a class C felony under IC
35-42-1-5;
(2) There is probable cause to believe that the child has com-
mitted the act; and
(3) The child was sixteen [16] years of age or older when the act
charged was allegedly committed; unless it would be in the best
interests of the child and of the safety and welfare of the com-
munity for him to remain within the juvenile justice system.
(e) Upon motion by the prosecutor, the juvenile court shall waive
jurisdiction if it finds that:
(1) The child is charged with an act which would be a felony if
committed by an adult; and
(2) The child has previously been convicted of a felony or a non-
traffic misdeameanor.
(f) No motion to waive jurisdiction may be made or granted after:
(1) The child has admitted the allegations in the petition at the
initial hearing; or
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 17, No. 4 [1983], Art. 9
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serious Class A felonies 1 are now automatically excluded from
juvenile court jurisdiction. 2 Public Law 266 is a hybrid waiver
statute which combines a legislative method of waiver with the tra-
ditional judicial method of waiver."
This note focuses on the positive effects Public Law 266 will
have on the juvenile waiver process in Indiana. Discussing the intro-
duction of a new waiver statute necessitates an initial review of the
classifications of waiver and corresponding procedural guidelines.
(2) The first witness has been sworn at the fact finding hearing.
(g) If jurisdiction is waived, the juvenile court shall order the child held
for proceedings in the court to which he is waived, and may fix a
recognizance bond for him to answer the charge in that court.
(h) The finding of probable cause required to waive jurisdiction is suffi-
cient to establish probable cause in the court to which the child is waived.
(i) The waiver order must include specific findings of fact to support the
order.
(j) The prosecutor shall file a copy of the waiver order with the court to
which the child has been waived when he files the indictment of informa-
tion." (citations omitted).
IND. CODE § 31-6-2-1(d) which is referred to in § 31-6-2-4(d) excludes juvenile court
jurisdiction for juveniles accused of certain serious Class A felonies. This section
states:
"(d) The juvenile court does not have jurisdiction over an individual for
an alleged violation of:
(1) IC 35-42-1-1 (murder);
(2) IC 35-42-3-2 (kidnapping);
(3) IC 35-42-4-1 (rape); or
(4) IC 35-42-5-1 (robbery), if:
(A) It was committed while armed with a
deadly weapon; or
(B) It results in bodily injury or serious
bodily injury; if the individual was sixteen
[16] years of age or older at the time of the
alleged violation.
Once such an individual has been charged
with any crime listed in clause (1) through (4) of this sub-
section, the court having adult criminal jurisdiction shall re-
tain jurisdiction over the case, even if the individual pleads
guilty to or is convicted of a lesser included offense. A plea
of guilty to, or a conviction of, a lesser included offense does
not vest jurisdiction in the juvenile court." (citations
omitted).
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. IND. CODE § 31-6-2-4-(B)-(c)-(d) (1981) are known as judicial waiver provi-
sions. IND. CODE § 31-6-2-1(d) (1981), which is referred to in IND. CODE § 31-6-2-4(d)
(1981), is known as a legislative or exclusionary waiver provision. For definitions of
judicial and legislative waiver provisions see infra notes 69-73, 86-92 and accompanying
text.
1983]
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Familiarity with waiver provisions in other states will facilitate an
understanding of the aggressive stance Public Law 266 takes against
the juvenile accused of a serious offense. Finally, subsequent sec-
tions of this note discuss the shortcomings of the statute, and pro-
pose recommendations toward correcting these defects.
PROCEDURAL GUIDELINES AND TYPES OF WAIVER STATUTES
The waiver proceeding could be as critical to the juvenile as a
verdict of guilt or innocence. A juvenile, if waived, could be sentenced
to death, whereas if he is kept under the jurisdiction of the juvenile
court, the most severe sentence he could receive would be a few
years in a juvenile home.u Because waiver can affect the juvenile of-
fender's disposition significantly, certain procedural guidelines must
be followed before completing the waiver process. The United
States Supreme Court established guidelines which must be followed
by the juvenile court judge in the judicial waiver proceeding.
Procedural Guidelines
In 1966, the United States Supreme Court was presented with
a case in which a juvenile was waived to an adult court without be-
ing afforded his constitutional right of due process under the law.'
In Kent v. United States,"' the juvenile court waived the defendant
to the adult court without a proper hearing.' The Court stated that,
34. Juveniles who are tried as adults often encounter drastic consequences.
An example is Tilton v. Commonwealth, where the seventeen year old defendant, after
being waived into adult criminal court, was convicted of murder and sentenced to
death. The most severe sentence available to the juvenile court was four years in the
State Boys' School. Tilton v. Commonwealth 196 Va. 774, 85 S.E.2d 368 (1955).
35. See infra note 42.
36. The landmark case interpreting juvenile waiver is Kent v. United States,
383 U.S. 541 (1966).
37. Id.
38. Kent was charged with housebreaking, robbery and rape. The offender
was sixteen years of age when these offenses allegedly took place. Kent was held for
one week before any action was taken against him. When the court finally did act, the
judge entered an order stating, "that after full investigation, I do hereby waive
jurisdiction and direct that the defendant be held for trial for the alleged offenses
under the regular procedure for the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia."
Neither Kent, his parents, nor his attorney were present at the "full hearing" that was
supposedly conducted. The judge made no findings of fact, nor did he recite any
reasons for waiver. Kent was waived into the criminal court. He was subsequently
tried and convicted of six counts of housebreaking and robbery, but found not guilty
by reason of insanity to the charge of rape. Kent was sentenced to serve five to fifteen
years on each count as to which he was found guilty, or a total of thirty to ninety
years in prison. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 17, No. 4 [1983], Art. 9
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although the juvenile court has broad discretion, waiver was not to
be a "license for arbitrary procedure." 9 The Court wanted to be cer-
tain that waiver was based on consideration of the criminal charge
and on the individual characteristics of the accused.'" Waiver was
not to be based on outside influences." Therefore, the Court
established determinative factors to be considered by the juvenile
courts before waiving the accused."2 The severity and degree of
violence of the alleged offense are of primary importance." Other
factors to be considered are: whether the offense was against per-
sons rather than property;" the attitude of the juvenile;'5 the juve-
nile's home environment;" previous offenses, if any;'7 whether the
public would be adequately protected if the juvenile remained in the
juvenile justice system;8 and certain practical aspects, such as
whether there is prosecutive merit 9 and whether the juvenile's ac-
complices are triable in juvenile court.' Determinative factors of
waiver, such as those set forth in Kent, have similarly been estab-
lished in Indiana.5 1
39. 383 U.S. at 553.
40. The Supreme Court in Kent cited the Court of Appeals as saying: " 'lIlt is
implicit in [the Juvenile Court] scheme that non-criminal treatment is to be the
rule-and the adult criminal treatment, the exception (to the waiver proceeding] which
must be governed by the particular factors of individual cases.' Harling v. United
States, 295 F.2d 161, 164-65 (D.C. Cir. 1961)." 383 U.S. at 560-61.
41. 383 U.S. AT 563
42. As stated in Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. at 566 (1966):
The determinative factors which will be considered by the Judge in decid-
ing whether the Juvenile Court's jurisdiction over such offenses will be
waived are the following:
1) The seriousness of the alleged offense to the community
and whether the protection of the community requires
waiver.
2) Whether the alleged offense was committed in an ag-
gressive, violent, pre-meditated, or willful manner.
3) Whether the alleged offense was against persons or
against property, greater weight being given to offenses
against person especially if personal injury resulted.
4) The prosecutive merit of the Complaint, i.e., whether
there is evidence upon which Grand Jury may be expected
to return an indictment (to be determined by consultation
with the United States Attorney).
5) The desirability of trial and disposition of the entire of-
fense in one count when the juvenile's associates in the alleged
offense are adults who will be charged with a crime in the
U.S. District Court.
6) The sophistication and maturity of the juvenile as deter-
mined by consideration of his home, environment situation,
emotional attitude and pattern of living.
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The Indiana Supreme Court in Summers v. State52 followed the
reasoning of the United States Supreme Court in Kent.' Again, the
importance of a full hearing for judicial waiver was stressed. 4 The
Indiana Supreme Court, also, set forth determinative factors to be
considered by the juvenile court judge in his ultimate decision of
whether to waive the accused juvenile.5 These factors included the
severity and degree of violence of the offense;" the possibility of
rehabilitation within the juvenile justice system;57 and whether the
7) The record and previous history of the juvenile, in-
cluding previous contacts with the Youth Aid Division, other
law enforcement agencies, juvenile courts and other jurisdic-
tion, prior periods of probation to this Court, or prior com-
mitments to juvenile institutions.
8) the prospects for adequate protection of the public and
the likelihood of reasonable rehabilitation of the juvenile (if
he is found to have committed the alleged offense) by the use
of procedures, services and facilities currently available to
the Juvenile Court.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. See infra note 55.
52. Summers v. State, 248 Ind. 551, 230 N.E.2d 320 (1967).
53. See supra note 42.
54. The Indiana Supreme Court stated: "Further we hold in accordance with
Kent that the appellant Summers should have a right to a full hearing in the Lake
Juvenile Court." 248 Ind. at 560, 230 N.E.2d at 325.
55. The determinative factors to be considered by the juvenile court judge in
Indiana are as follows:
In this regard, we would say that an offense committed by a juvenile may
be waived to a criminal court if the offense has specific prosecutive merit
in the opinion of the prosecuting attorney; or if it is heinous or of an ag-
gravated character, greater weight being given to offenses against person
than to offenses against property; or, even though less serious, if the of-
fense is part of a repetitive pattern of juvenile offenses which would lead
to a determination that said juvenile may be beyond rehabilitation under
the regular statutory juvenile procedures; or where it is found to be in
the best interest of the public welfare and for the protection of the public
security generally that said juvenile be required to stand trial as an adult
offender.
Summers v. State, 248 Ind. at 561, 230 N.E.2d at 325.
56. Id.
57. Id.
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public would be adequately protected if the juvenile was detained in
the juvenile justice system." The factors set forth by both Summers
and Kent balance the needs of the accused with those of society. 9
However, many states have circumvented the strict procedural
guidelines set forth by Kent" and Summers." These states have ac-
complished this task by enacting statutes which allow a juvenile to
be tried in adult court by circumventing the traditional method of
waiver completely.2 An examination of the different methods of
waiver is helpful to grasp a clear understanding of the process
employed by these statutes to circumvent the procedural guidelines.
Type of Waiver Statutes
The primary distinction between judicial, legislative, prosecu-
torial, and hybrid waiver statutes lies in who retains the discre-
tionary power of waiver."' Further, within each of the classifications,
state waiver statutes vary as to the severity of the offense required
for waiver;" the maximum age for juvenile court jurisdiction;9 and
the minimum age for which waiver is appropriate." The degree of
incongruousness is exemplified by failure of some states to allow
waiver of a juvenile, 7 while other states allow waiver of a mere in-
fant." Examining each classification of waiver, with a corresponding
58. Id.
59. See supra notes 42 and 55. The first determinative factor set forth in
Kent and the fourth factor in Summers both relate to whether the public will be ade-
quately protected if the juvenile is not incarcertated in an adult facility.
60. See supra note 42.
61. See supra note 54.
62. For a discussion of these waiver provisions and their constitutionality, see
infra notes 180-97 and accompanying text.
63. See Hard-Core Youth, supra note 3, at 658.
64. Some states, such as California and Alaska, allow waiver for any criminal
offense. Whereas, other states restrict waiver for felonies. These states include Colo-
rado and Kentucky. Still others restrict waiver to serious personal offense felonies
only, such as murder or rape. Examples of these states are New Mexico and Montana.
For the appropriate waiver statutes, see supra note 9.
65. The maximum age varies from sixteen to nineteen. For appropriate state
statutes, see supra note 9.
66. Some states do not have minimum ages. For example, Arkansas and
Maine. Other states do not allow waiver for a juvenile under seventeen years of age
for certain specified offenses. Examples of these states are Washington and
Massachusetts. For appropriate state statutes, see supra note 9.
67. In Nebraska and New York there are no judicial methods of waiver. For
the appropriate state statutes, see supra note 9.
68. Under Arizona law, it is theoretically possible to prosecute a mere infrant
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example of a state statute which utilizes that method of waiver, is
helpful in understanding Indiana's hybrid waiver statute.
Judicial Waiver Statute
Judicial waiver is the method of waiver traditionally used by
most states. 9 The judicial waiver statute vests the discretionary
power of waiver in the juvenile court judge.7° However, before he
can exercise his discretionary power, the juvenile court judge must
abide by the procedural guidelines set forth in Kent." The discre-
tionary power of waiver is appropriately vested in the judiciary,
since judicial proceedings in general must be accompanied by the
constitutional aspects of notice, a full and fair hearing, and right to
counsel. 2 These same rights are afforded to the juvenile in a judicial
waiver proceeding.
7
California utilizes a judicial waiver statute.74 This statute pro-
vides the juvenile with the procedural guidelines associated with the
traditional judicial waiver statute.75 However, this judicial waiver
statute is unique in that it encourages waiver of the juvenile to
adult court by creating a rebuttable presumption in favor of waiving
the juvenile to adult court. 7
In 1976, the California juvenile code underwent drastic revision. 7
The code was amended by a subsection aimed specifically at the
if the prosecutor can show that the offender was aware that the act he committed was
wrong.
A person less than fourteen years old at the time of the conduct charged
is not criminally responsible in the absence of clear proof that at the time
of committing the conduct charged the person knew it was wrong.
ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-501 (1978).
69. Only Nebraska and New York do not have a judicial waiver provision
enacted. For appropriate state statutes, see supra note 9.
70. See Kent Revisited, supra note 24, at 597.
71. See supra note 42.
72. See Hard-Core Youth, supra note 3, at 659.
73. Id.
74. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 707 (West 1981).
75. Id.
76. Id. If the juvenile fails to offer conclusive evidence of why he should be re-
tained under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court, he will be waived to the adult court.
77. 3 C. SMITH, ET AL., UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE LAW ENFORCE-
MENT ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION, REPORTS OF THE NATIONAL JUVENILE JUSTICE
ASSESSMENT CENTERS, A NATIONAL ASSESSMENT OF SERIOUS JUVENILE CRIME AND THE
JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM: The Need for a Rational Response 34 (1980) [hereinafter
referred to as SMITH].
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juvenile accused of certain "target offenses."78 This statute creates a
presumption in favor of waiving the juvenile accused of such target
offenses to adult court.79 Under this statute, the juvenile has the
burden of proving why he should be retained under the jurisdiction
of the juvenile justice system." If the juvenile fails to demonstrate
that he is a fit candidate for rehabilitation, he is waived to the adult
court. 1 Although Indiana's Public Law 266 facilitates waiver by
allowing waiver of a juvenile charged with a crime defined vaguely
as "heinous or aggravated,"82 it does not create a presumption favor-
ing waiver as does the California statute.
Judicial waiver statutes which presume waiver, such as the
statute in California, implicitly question the philosophy of the juve-
nile justice system. However, waiver statutes which are created to
circumvent the procedural guidelines of judicial waiver doubt the ef-
fectiveness of a juvenile justice system entirely. Since legislative
and prosecutorial waiver statutes circumvent the procedural guide-
lines set forth in Kent," state legislatures which enact these
methods of waiver arguably doubt the justification for the juvenile
court entirely. Public Law 266 adopted a legislative waiver provi-
sion. 5
Legislative Waiver Statutes
Under the legislative waiver statute, the state legislature re-
tains the discretionary power to exclude certain juveniles from juve-
nile court." Exclusion can be based on either age or the offense
78. These "target offenses" include: murder; arson of an inhabited building;
robbery while armed with a dangerous or deadly weapon; rape with force or violence
or threat of great bodily harm; kidnapping for ransom; kidnapping for purposes of rob-
bery; kidnapping with bodily harm; assault with intent to murder or attempted
murder; assault with a firearm or a destructive device; assault by any means of force
likely to produce great bodily injury; and, discharge of a firearm into an inhabited or
occupied building. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 707 (West 1981).
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. See supra note 30. IND. CODE § 31-6-2-4(b) (1981).
83. Id.
84. See supra note 42.
85. See infra notes 86-90 and accompanying text for a discussion of legislative
waiver statutes. IND. CODE § 31-6-2-1(d) (1981). See infra notes 86-90 and accompanying
text for a discussion of legislative waiver statutes. IND. CODE § 31-6-2-1(d) (1981) con-
tains the legislative waiver provision. See supra note 30.
86. See Kent Revisited, supra note 24, at 596.
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charged. 7 Because the legislature has this discretionary power to
exclude certain juveniles, these statutes are also referred to as ex-
clusionary waiver statutes.8
Legislative waiver is not waiver in its true sense. Waiver tra-
ditionally involves a process whereby the juvenile court transfers
its jurisdiction over the accused juvenile to the adult court. 9
However, since the juvenile court never attains jurisdiction under a
legislative waiver statute, it cannot waive the accused. Thus, a legis-
lative waiver statute, although allowing prosecution of the juvenile
in adult court, cannot literally be called a waiver statute. Legislative
waiver does not provide for the procedural guidelines associated
with judicial waiver." Recognizing the lack of necessary safeguards
in legislative waiver statutes, a majority of states combine legisla-
tive waiver with either judicial or prosecutorial waiver provisions. 1
Currently, only New York employs the legislative waiver as its sole
waiver provision."
Juveniles under sixteen years of age are subject to exclusive
jurisdiction of the New York juvenile justice system." However, a
juvenile under sixteen years of age, when charged with certain
enumerated offenses, is no longer classified as a juvenile by the
court. In this situation, the juvenile cannot be tried in juvenile
court. At first glance, New York appears to have a very rehabilita-
tive juvenile justice system since it does not allow for judicial
waiver," arguably on the assumption that all juveniles are rehabili-
tative. However, closer examination reveals that the New York
juvenile code may be the most punitive." This statute excludes juve-
87. Id.
88. For simplicity, the terms legislative waiver and exclusionary waiver are
to be used interchangeably throughout this note.
89. See Hard-Core Youth, supra note 3, at 659.
90. See Kent Revisited, supra note 24, at 597.
91. New York is the only state utilizing the pure legislative waiver. N.Y.
CRIM. PROC. LAW § 180.75 (McKinney 1975).
92. Id.
93. The New York Family Court has exclusive jurisdiction over juveniles who
are alleged to be delinquent. N.Y. JUD. LAW § 713 (McKinney 1975).
94. Id.
95. The waiver provision is the vehicle by which the juvenile court can try
those individuals they believe to be beyond rehabilitation in adult court. If the juvenile
court does not allow the waiver, then it can be argued that all of the juveniles under
its jurisdiction must be amenable to rehabilitation.
96. See supra SMITH, note 77, at 58. This report phrased it as: "Perhaps the
most unusual, most punitive and most incontroversial of all provisions are those passed
by New York .... "
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niles as young as thirteen years of age."7 Few juvenile courts ex-
clude or cease jurisdiction over juveniles at such an early age.98
Although Indiana utilizes a legislative waiver provision, it does not
exclude juveniles under sixteen years of age."
Legislative waiver provisions have been labeled incompatible
with the goals of the juvenile justice system since they deny the
juvenile an opportunity to show that he is amenable to rehabilita-
tion in spite of the charge against him.'00 Concededly, the juvenile is
excluded without allowing him an opportunity to be heard. How-
ever, the decision of which juveniles, based on the charge against
them, are excluded from the juvenile court is determined by the
state legislators. In contrast, the decision of which juveniles are to
be excluded in the prosecutorial waiver statute is decided by the
prosecutor alone.'
Prosecutorial Waiver Statutes
The prosecutorial waiver procedure allows a prosecutor the dis-
cretion to determine the forum in which a juvenile, accused of a seri-
ous offense, will be tried. °2 This type of waiver provision has drawn
97. Under the New York Family Court Act, a thirteen year old can be excluded
if charged with an act that would be second degree murder. To determine whether or
not a child of tender age can be charged with the offense in criminal court § 30.00 of
CPL must be read in conjunction with § 712 of the Family Court Act.
98. States which utilize exclusionary waiver statutes include: Colorado, Dela-
ware, District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Maryland, Nevada, New Mex-
ico, North Carolina, and Pennsylvania. See supra note 9 for applicable statutes. Of
these states, only six exclude younger juveniles than New York from jurisdiction of
the juvenile court. Delaware excludes from juvenile court jurisdiction anyone charged
with first degree murder, rape, or kidnapping. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 921 (1975).
Florida excludes from juvenile court jurisdiction anyone who is charged with an of-
fense that is punishable by death or life imprisonment if the grand jury returns an in-
dictment. FLA. STATE. ANN. § 39.02(c) (Supp. 1981). Georgia excludes from juvenile
court jurisdiction anyone who is charged with an offense that is punishable by death or
life imprisonment. GA. CODE ANN. § 24(a)-301(b) (1981). Nevada excludes from juvenile
court jurisdiction anyone charged with murder or attempted murder. NEv. REV. STAT.
§ 62.040(c)(1) (1979). North Carolina excludes from juvenile court jurisdiction anyone
charged with a capital offense. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-280 (1980). Pennsyvania excludes
from juvenile court jurisdiction anyone charged with murder. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 6302 (Purdon 1981). Other states that have sixteen as the maximum age for juvenile
court jurisdiction include Connecticut, Kentucky, Nebraska and North Carolina. See
note 9 supra for appropriate statutes.
99. See supra note 30.
100. See Hard-Core Youth, supra note 3, at 661.
101. Id. at 660.
102. Id.
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a large amount of criticism. The major criticism has been that the
prosecutor cannot be expected to objectively weigh the welfare of
the juvenile against the need to protect society.' Concededly, this
may occur because of the lack of procedural safeguards. However,
prosecutorial decisions, in general, have never been subject to due
process protections.'"4 The prosecutor has always been given un-
bridled discretion to charge the offender as he deems appropriate.'01
The fact that a juvenile is involved should not change this age-old
function.' The unbridled discretion is one of the major drawbacks
of prosecutorial waiver provisions and is arguably the reason
Nebraska remains the only state utilizing this method of waiver. 7
The Nebraska prosecutorial waiver statute contains many pro-
cedural safeguards associated with judicial waiver provisions. The
prosecutor "shall" consider factors such as the severity of the crime;
the age of the offender; and the motivation for alleged commission
of the offense' before determining whether to file the case in juve-
nile or adult court. The use of these guidelines contravenes the pur-
pose of utilizing a prosecutorial waiver statute. By mandating pro-
cedural guidelines, Nebraska shows its dissatisfaction with the pure
prosecutorial waiver statute. Indiana Public Law 266 does not con-
tain a prosecutorial waiver statute because of the dissatisfaction
with this method of waiver.'
Because of the inherent defects of each pure method of waiver,
many states are enacting waiver statutes which combine the best of
one or more of the three waiver provisions. Statutes of this nature
are referred to as hybrid waiver statutes. The passage of Public
Law 266 created a hybrid waiver statute in Indiana."'
Hybrid Waiver Statute
Indiana"' and Vermont" ' are two of the most recent examples
103. Id.
104. Cox v. United States, 473 F.2d 334, 335 (4th Cir. 1973). This court phrased
it as, "We have no such tradition with respect to prosecutorial decisions, to seek an
indictment, or not to seek one, .... to charge a greater offense or a lesser one."
105. Id.
106. United States v. Bland, 472 F.2d 1329, 1337 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
107. NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-202.01 (1978).
108. Id.
109. See supra note 30.
110. Id.
111. Indiana Senate Bill 109, soon to be Public 266, was passed on January 29,
1981.
112. Vermont House Bill 1 was passed in a specially called session on July 17,
1981.
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of states utilizing hybrid waiver statutes. The hybrid waiver statute
in Indiana combines judicial and legislative methods of waiver, while
Vermont combines judicial and prosecutorial methods to form its
hybrid waiver statute."' Until recently Vermont did not allow
waiver of a juvenile under sixteen years of age."' The present Ver-
mont statute allows prosecutorial waiver for juveniles aged sixteen
to eighteen; judicial waiver, with a presumption of waiver to adult
court, for juveniles aged fourteen to sixteen; and judicial waiver,
with a presumption of retaining jurisdiction in juvenile court, for
juveniles aged ten to fourteen, accused of certain enumerated of-
fense."5 The judicial waiver proceedings in Vermont must be accom-
panied by procedural guidelines similar to those set forth in Kent."6
The prosecutorial waiver proceeding, unlike the statute enacted in
Nebraska, does not have procedural guidelines."7 The approach
taken by Vermont towards serious juvenile crime is very similar to
the approach Indiana is taking with the passage of Public Law 266.
Although no waiver statute is infallible, a hybrid waiver
statute eliminates many of the shortcomings of each pure method of
waiver. Similarly, Public Law 266 should eliminate many of the
faults of previous Indiana waiver statutes."8 Public Law 266 appears
to be the culmination of a recent trend in aggresively treating the
juvenile accused of a serious offense. It also may be indicative of a
change in philosophy by the Indiana legislature regarding the ability
of the juvenile justice system to rehabilitate the juvenile offender.
WAIVER IN INDIANA
Over each of the last four years, the Indiana legislature has
either added to or amended provisions of the waiver statute."9 Some
of these changes have been facial alterations 12 while others have
broadened the classes of juveniles subject to the waiver process."'
Further changes introduced new methods of waiver not available
113. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33 § 635(A) (1981).
114. Prior to passage of House Bill 1, 1981 Vt. Acts, Vermont did not allow for
waiver of juveniles under 16 years of age. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33 § 635 (1980).
115. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33 § 635 (1981).
116. See supra note 42.
117. See supra note 107.
118. Compare supra note 28 with note 30.
119. The Indiana Juvenile Code has been added by 1978 Ind. Acts, Public Law
136; amended by 1979 Ind. Acts, Public Law 276; 1980 Ind. Acts, Public Law 182; and
1981 Ind. Acts, Public Law 266.
120. See infra notes 123-26 and accompanying text.
121. See infra notes 127-35 and accompanying text.
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under the Indiana juvenile code." Each of these changes indicate
dissatisfaction with the prior law. The changes further indicated a
gradual change of philosophy towards the treatment of the juvenile
accused of a serious offense. This changing philosophy lead to the
passage of Public Law 266.
The legislative trend of enlarging the class of juveniles subject
to waiver began in 1978 with the passage of Public Law 136, an act
which revamped the then existing juvenile law into a comprehensive
juvenile code. 2 ' The 1979 changes provided additional procedural
safeguards to be followed by the juvenile court judge in the waiver
proceeding.' This act increased the guidelines set forth by Sum-
mers. '2 As a result of the 1979 amendment, the juvenile court judge
must show "probable cause to believe that the child" 26 committed
the act before he can be waived. The 1978 and 1979 amendments
were aimed more at surface changes of the waiver statute, whereas
the 1980 and 1981 amendments constitute substantive changes.
The 1980 amendment to the Indiana juvenile law broadened the
class of offenses for which the accused juvenile, without a past con-
viction, could be waived." Prior to this act,128 the accused juvenile,
without a past conviction, could be waived if he was charged with
murder, a Class A felony," or a Class B felony."3 With the addition
122. Public Law 266 introduced the legislative method of waiver. See supra
note 30.
123. 1978 Ind. Acts, Public Law 126.
124. 1979 Ind. Acts, Public Law 276.
125. See supra note 55.
126. See supra note 124.
127. 1980 Ind. Acts, Public Law 182.
128. Id.
129. The list of Class A felonies are defined in the following Indiana statutes:
IND. CODE § 35-42-3-2 (1981) (Kidnapping); IND. CODE § 35-42-4-1 (1981) (Rape if commit-
ted by using or threatening the use of deadly force, or while armed with a deadly
weapon); IND. CODE § 35-42-4-2 (1981) (Criminal deviate conduct, if committed by using
or threatening the use of deadly force, or while armed with a deadly weapon); IND.
CODE § 35-42-4-3 (1981) (Child Molesting if committed by using or threatening the use
of deadly force, or while armed with a deadly weapon); IND. CODE § 35-42-5-1 (1981)
(Robbery, if it results in bodily injury); IND. CODE § 35-43-1-1 (1981) (Arson, if bodily in-
jury results); and IND. CODE § 35-43-2-1 (1981) (Burglary if it results in bodily injury).
130. The list of Class B felonies are defined in the following Indiana statutes:
IND. CODE § 35-42-1-2 (1981) (Causing Suicide); IND. CODE § 35-42-1-3 (1981) (Voluntary
manslaughter); IND. CODE § 35-42-3-3 (1981) (Criminal Confinement, if committed while
armed with a deadly weapon); IND. CODE § 35-42-4-1 (1981) (Rape); IND. CODE § 35-42-4-2
(1981) (Criminal Deviate Conduct); IND. CODE § 35-42-4-3 (1981) (Child Molesting); IND.
CODE § 35-42-5-1 (Robbery, if committed while armed with a deadly weapon); IND. CODE
§ 35-43-1-1 (1981) (Arson); and IND. CODE § 35-43-2-1 (1981) (Burglary, if committed while
armed with a deadly weapon or if the building is a dwelling).
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of the 1980 amendment, an accused juvenile, without a past convic-
tion, can be waived if charged with involuntary manslaughter, as a
Class C felony, or reckless homicide as a Class C felony, in addition
to the previously named offenses.' The inclusion of these offenses
broadened the class of juveniles subject to waiver for crimes which
resulted in the death of the victim. Both the 1980 and 1981 amend-
ments enlarged the class of juveniles susceptible to waiver. How-
ever, whereas the 1980 statute enlarged the class by lowering the
age limitations, the 1981 statute did so by introducing a new classifi-
cation of waiver.
The passage of Public Law 266 in 1981 introduced a provision
which allows for waiver of the juvenile recidivist at any age,'32 as
well as enacting a legislative method of waiver. 3 The recidivist pro-
vision' allows for waiver of the juvenile recidivist without the
necessity of a full investigation and hearing. 1 5 To appreciate the im-
pact of these changes, it is necessary to examine individual sections
of Public Law 266 and to compare Public Law 266 with similar pro-
visions in other jurisdictions.
The first major change proposed by Public Law 266 is the legis-
lative exclusionary statute.3 ' This statute excludes from the juve-
nile justice system juveniles sixteen years of age or older charged
with murder, kidnapping, rape, or robbery, if committed with a
deadly weapon or which resulted in bodily injury.' 7 These offenses
are Class A felonies punishable by up to fifty years in prison."'
Compared to the exclusionary waiver statute in New York,39
Indiana has a fairly lenient statute. New York excludes juveniles,
fourteen years of age, charged with offenses such as assault, burg-
lary, and arson, from the juvenile court."' Although these offenses
131. See supra notes 129 and 130.
132. IND. CODE § 31-6-2-4(e) (1981) [hereinafter referred to as "recidivist provi-
sion"].
133. IND. CODE § 31-6-2-1(d) (1981) [hereinafter referred to as "exclusionary pro-
vision"].
134. See supra note 132.
135. Id.
136. See supra note 133.
137. Id.
138. For the list of Class A felonies, see supra note 129. A person convicted of
a Class A felony "shall be imprisoned for a fixed term of thirty (30) years, with not
more than twenty (20) years added for aggravating circumstances or not more than ten
(10) years subtracted for mitigating circumstances; in addition, he may be fined not
more than ten thousand dollars ($10,000.00)." IND. CODE § 35-50-2-4 (1981).
139. See supra notes 91-97 and accompanying text.
140. Id.
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are not insignificant, the exclusion of the juvenile from the juvenile
justice system should be limited to serious personal offenses. The
only offenses for which the accused juvenile can be excluded in In-
diana are serious personal offenses.' Similarly, Indiana does not
believe that a person under sixteen years of age should be automati-
cally excluded from juvenile court,"2 while New York allows a juve-
nile as young as thirteen years of age to be excluded.' Indiana,
although taking an aggressive stance against serious juvenile crime,
has not gone to the extremes evidenced by the New York statute.'
Although Indiana does not allow legislative waiver of the four-
teen or fifteen year old juvenile, it does permit judicial waiver of
these individuals. Section 3 of Public Law 266 allows for waiver of a
juvenile, who is at least fourteen years of age and charged with an
act that is heinous or aggravated. This section also allows for a juve-
nile to be waived if charged with an act, although less serious, which
is part of a repetitive pattern of delinquent acts.'45 Additionally,
waiver will only be effective after a full investigation and hearing"'
which encompasses the procedural guidelines set forth in Kent"7 and
Summers.' Indiana as well allows waiver of a ten year old if he is
charged with murder."9 Unlike California's statute, Public Law 266
does not create a presumption in favor of waiving the accused
juvenile. 5' California only allows for waiver if the offender has
reached his sixteenth year of age. 5 ' However, under the California
statute,5 2 this individual is subject to be waived for any violation of
the criminal code. Although a fourteen year old can be waived in In-
diana, the offenses for which the court may waive the accused are
limited."S In this respect, arguably, Indiana places greater faith in
the discretion of its juvenile court judges than does California.
Public Law 266 also added a judicial waiver statute aimed at
141. See supra note 30. The offenses excluded are murder, kidnapping, rape or
robbery.
142. See supra note 30.
143. See supra note 97.
144. See supra notes 91-97 and accompanying text.
145. IND. CODE § 31-6-2-4(b) (1981). See supra note 30.
146. Id.
147. See supra note 42.
148. See supra note 55.
149. IND. CODE § 31-6-2-4(c) (1981). See supra note 30.
150. See supra note 30.
151. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 707 (West 1981).
152. Id.
153. See supra note 30.
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the juvenile recidivist."M This provision allows the juvenile court to
waive the individual, regardless of age, if it finds that he is charged
with an act which would be a felony if committed by an adult and if
he has previously been convicted of a felony or non-traffic misde-
meanor." This judicial waiver statute, unlike most, does not provide
for a full investigation and hearing. The lack of procedural safe-
guards in this waiver provision seems to reflect a legislative atti-
tude that since the juvenile has already been declared unfit for the
juvenile justice system once, and subsequently was tried and con-
victed in adult court, he is no longer worthy of the benefits of the
juvenile justice system.
Public Law 266 revised the waiver process in Indiana signifi-
cantly. The recent trend of waiver provisions in Indiana expresses
the aggressive attitude of the legislature against serious juvenile
crime. From this legislative attitude, it can be concluded that the
legislature doubts the ability of the juvenile justice system to ade-
quately rehabilitate the serious juvenile offender. However, Public
Law 266 may be more than the culimination of an aggressive trend
towards serious juvenile crime. Public Law 266 may signal the
beginning of a changing philosophy in the legislature toward the
juvenile accused of a serious offense.
PUBLIC LAW 266 ANALYZED
Although Public Law 266 is new and its impact uncertain, facially
it presents both advantages and shortcomings. However, an analysis
of the statute reveals that the positive aspects of the statute out-
number the negative. The increasing percentage of serious juvenile
crime 6' and the considerable amount of juvenile recidivism5. under-
lies the aggressive stance of Public Law 266. Its popularity in the
Indiana Legislature"s and constitutional validity159 further support
the statute. These aspects of Public Law 266 will be analyzed indi-
vidually.
Justification for Public Law 266
Public Law 266 is a calculated action taken by the Indiana
154. IND. CODE § 31-6-2-4(e) (1981). See supra note 30.
155. Id.
156. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
157. See infra note 174 and accompanying text.
158. See infra note 161 and accompanying text.
159. See infra notes 183-96 and accompanying text.
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Legislature to avoid the procedural guidelines associated with juve-
nile waiver.8 0 The passage of this statute may reflect a change in
philosophy toward the juvenile accused of a serious felony. Argu-
ably, the legislature, through Public Law 266, is questioning the
theory that juveniles are more amenable to rehabilitation than
adults. Furthermore, it can be concluded that this change in philoso-
phy is felt throughout the legislature since Public Law 266 was passed
without opposition."" Implicit in this change of philosophy is a more
aggressive effort to reduce serious juvenile crime.
The increase in serious juvenile crime presents an immediate
as well as a future problem which warrants timely action.' Juvenile
crime is no longer limited to the traditional offenses such as van-
dalism or drug related offenses.6 3 Juveniles are contributing signifi-
cantly to serious crime in America; crimes such as murder, forcible
rape, burglary, and robbery."u In fact, statistics reveal that approx-
imately fifty percent of the burglaries are committed by persons
under eighteen years of age. 1" These offenders are not the same
breed of juvenile offender for which the juvenile justice system was
introduced.'66 As such it should not be surprising that the juvenile
justice system has become antiquated and inadequate. Public Law
266, however, makes necessary adjustments for the present-day
serious juvenile offender by allowing him to be waived to a judicial
forum more conducive to an appropriate balance between juvenile
and societal needs.
If waived, the accused juvenile is subjected to a judicial process
not premised solely on rehabilitation, 7 but on other goals of the
160. The exact reason for passage of certain statutes can only be conjectured,
because Indiana does not publish legislative history. However, each branch of the
government has constructive, if not actual, knowledge of the decisions of other govern-
ment branches. Summers was decided in 1967 and clearly set forth the procedural
guidelines for the judicial waiver process. Thereafter, Public Law 266 sidestepped
these procedural guidelines.
161. Indiana Senate Bill 109, soon to be Public Law 266, was passed on January
29, 1981. The vote taken was forty-eight for and zero against. Two voted present.
162. See supra note 1.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. The exact figure for 1979 is 48.6%. Id.
166. See generally 2 C. SMITH, ET AL., UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION, REPORTS OF THE NATIONAL JUVENILE
JUSTICE ASSESSMENT CENTERS, A NATIONAL ASSESSMENT OF SERIOUS JUVENILE CRIME
AND THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM: THE NEED FOR A RATIONAL RESPONSE (1980).
167. See W. GAYLIN, PARTIAL JUSTICE: A STUDY OF BIAS IN SENTENCING 17
(1974).
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criminal justice system such as retribution, protection of society, in-
dividual deterrence, and general deterrence.'" In this forum, the ac-
cused juvenile receives rights not available to him in juvenile
court."9 These rights include the right to be t~ied by a jury of his
peers.'
In keeping with the goals of a separate juvenile justice system,
Public Law 266 does not seek to punish the juvenile offender.
Rather, its purpose is to place the juvenile accused of a serious of-
fense in a judicial forum better equipped to balance the needs of the
juvenile and society. Public Law 266 may also be directed at an in-
herent defect of the juvenile justice system: the theory that
juveniles are more amenable to rehabilitation than adults. This
theory has not yet been proven.'
The justification for having a juvenile judicial system separate
from the adult system is based on the premise that juveniles are
more amenable to rehabilitation than adults.'72 However, no evidence
presently exists to support this proposition.' Therefore, rather
than simply waive the accused juvenile to the jurisdiction of the
adult court, Public Law 266 essentially removes the juvenile from a
168. Id.
169. Juveniles are not provided all of the procedural safeguards in the juvenile
court that adults receive in criminal court. The rights a juvenile is entitled to are
outlines in IND. CODE § 31-6-3-1 (1981):
(a) Except when the child may be excluded from a hearing under IC
31-6-7-10, the child is entitled:
(1) to cross-examine witnesses;
(2) to obtain -witnesses or tangible evidence by compulsory
process; and
(3) to introduce evidence on his own behalf.
(b) A child charged with a declinquent act is also entitled to:
(1) be represented by counsel under IC 31-6-7-2;
(2) Refrain from testifying against himself; and
(3) Confront witnesses.
170. These rights are not granted to the juvenile. Compare with the criteria
listed in Id.
171. There is no empirical evidence showing that juveniles are more amenable
to rehabilitation than adults. "Keeping some offenders out of the system, however,
does not solve the problem of an unfulfilled promise of rehabilitation for those who
continue to go through the system. It is not possible to prove conclusively that
rehabilitation is ineffective. But if, 77 years after enactment of the first juvenile court
act, we still lack evidence that the juvenile justice system rehabilitates, perhaps it is
time to consider abandoning reliance on rehabilitation as a basis for the system."
Rehabilitation as a Justification, supra note 4, at 1016.
172. See supra notes 2-5 and accompanying text.
173. See supra note 171.
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system which has not been proven effective, to a system whose
methods have been shown to be effectual. This adds further support
to the proposition that Public Law 266 is more than an addition to
the waiver statute. It is indicative of a change in the philosophy of
the legislature towards the treatment of the juvenile accused of a
serious offense.
A further change in legislative philosophy is reflected in the
approach Public Law 266 takes towards juvenile recidivism. The
legislature must have recognized the serious problem of juvenile
recidivism17' because it passed a provision aimed directly at this of-
fender."7 Statistics indicate that fifty-four percent of all juvenile of-
fenders commit at least two offenses."' The recidivist commits his
first at an early age and, in most instances, continues to commit
crimes until he is apprehended." Under prior law, even if the juve-
nile recidivist was apprehended, the state would probably place him
in a correctional system not conducive to his needs.' This system
was the juvenile justice system. In general, the juvenile justice
system tends to punish the older recidivist at the end of his criminal
career rather than the young and criminally active one.9 With the
addition of Public Law 266, the young and criminally active recidi-
vist can not be waived into adult court jurisdiction.
The constitutionality of exclusionary waiver statutes, similar to
section 1(d) of Public Law 266,"8° has been decided in other courts.''
These decisions indicate that another positive aspect of Public Law
266 is that it should survive constitutional scrutiny. The sections
174. Studies have shown that between 40%/ and 54% of all juveniles who com-
mit one offense, go on to commit at least one more offense. The class of offenses for
which 30% of the recidivists were charged with was either murder and nonnegligent
manslaughter, forcible rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, larceny-theft,
motor vehicle theft or arson. See generally M. WOLFGANG, R. FIGLIO, T. SELLIN, DELIN-
QUENCY IN A BIRTH COHORT (1972).
175. IND. CODE § 31-6-2-4(e) (1981). See supra note 30.
176. See supra note 174.
177. See Boland, Fighting Crime: The Problem of Adolescents, 71 J. CRIM. L.
CRIMINOLOGY 94 (1980) [hereinafter referred to as Fighting Crime].
178. Id. at 96-97.
179. Id.
180. See supra note 30.
181. Cases which discuss the constitutionality of exclusionary statutes include:
Woodward v. Wainwright, 556 F.2d 781 (5th Cir. 1977), cert denied, 434 U.S. 1088
(1978); Cox v. United States, 473 F.2d 334 (4th Cir. 1973); United States v. Bland, 472
F.2d 1329 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Johnson v. State, 314 So. 2d 573 (Fla. 1975); State v. Shep-
pard, 371 So. 2d 1135 (La. 1979). In each case the court has upheld the constitutionality
of the exclusionary statute.
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most vulnerable to constitutional challenge are sections 1(d), the ex-
clusionary provision, and 4(e), the recidivist provision.18
The principle constitutional challenge to Public Law 266 would
be the failure of the exclusionary waiver provision to provide for
the due process rights of the juvenile."' This attack has focused on
the power vested in the prosecutor to determine whether a juvenile
will be tried as an adult since the prosecutor decides what charge to
bring against the accused juvenile.' At least one court addressing
the constitutionality of such a provision has held that the tradition
of due process has never been extended to decisions of prosecutorial
discretion.'" Public Law 266 should survive this challenge because
the exclusion of similar offenses in other jurisdictions has been
upheld.'" As well as being challenged on due process grounds, these
statutes have been challenged as violative of equal protection under
the law.
The equal protection challenge questions the power of the legis-
lature to distinguish between minors accused of serious offenses and
those accused of lesser crimes." This is precisely what the exclu-
sionary waiver statute and the recidivist statute attempt to do. The
courts have quickly disposed of this constitutional challenge.'88 One
court held that to distinguish between juveniles charged with
capital offenses and those charged with felonies is "neither arbitrary
nor unreasonable." '18 9 Additionally, distinguishing juveniles on the
basis of a serious felony or recidivism does not violate their rights
of equal protection under the law since this distinction is neither ar-
bitrary nor unreasonable. Differentiating juveniles on the basis of
race, 90 religion,191 or sex" would be an arbitrary classification.
There is a substantial state interest in distinguishing juveniles ac-
cused of a serious felony and juvenile recidivist. That substantial
state interest is the protection of society.'93
182. See supra note 30.
183. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
184. See infra note 185.
185. Cox v. United States, 473 F.2d at 335.
186. See supra notes 180-81.
187. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1.
188. See supra notes 180-81.
189. State v. Sheppard, 371 So. 2d at 1139.
190. Russell v. Parratt, 543 F.2d 1214, 1217 (8th Cir. 1976).
191. Id.
192. Lamb v. Brown, 456 F.2d 18, 20 (10th Cir. 1972).
193. The protection of society is a determinative factor in the waiver pro-
cedure set forth by Kent and Summers. See supra notes 42 and 55.
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The right to be tried in a juvenile court is not an inherent
one."' The individual states have the power to restrict or qualify the
correctional treatment the juvenile receives. 9 Public Law 266
restricts the serious juvenile offender from treatment under the
juvenile justice system. Further, since the distinction is "neither ar-
bitrary nor unreasonable,"1 Public Law 266 does not violate the
constitutional rights of the juvenile. As such, Public Law 266 should
survive constitutional scrutiny. However, constitutional validity is
not the sole benefit of Public Law 266. It is also beneficial because it
eliminates unbridled judicial discretion. 97
Under the prior waiver statute, two individuals charged with
the same offense, committed under similar circumstances, could be
tried in different court systems.'98 This judicial discretion could lead
to a great disparity in sentences. Public Law 266 eliminates this
discretion by automatically excluding all juveniles charged with a
serious felony."9 An offender who is convinced that he was treated
more harshly than others who have committed similar offenses is
likely to be much more difficult to control in a corrective setting.
21
The exclusionary waiver provision of Public Law 266 eliminates
some of the judicial discretion that could lead to a disparity of
forums for juveniles accused of similar offenses. The serious juvenile
offender is now automatically held accountable for his actions in
adult court.
It appears that the reasons for waiving the juvenile accused of
a serious offense are justified. The rising juvenile crime rate,"' the
amount of juvenile recidivism,"' and the seriousness of the offenses
are factors which support Public Law 266. There are, nonetheless,
shortcomings in the statute's method. The statutory scheme, how-
ever, is not beyond repair.
194. The Court in Woodward v. Wainwright, 556 F.2d at 785, held "that treat-
ment as a juvenile is not an inherent right but one granted by the state legislature,
therefore, the legislature may restrict or qualify that right as it sees fit, as long as no
arbitrary or discriminatory classification is involved."
195. Id.
196. See supra notes 189-93 and accompanying text.
197. IND. CODE § 31-6-2-1(d) (1981) eliminated part of the judicial discretion by
enacting an exclusionary waiver provision. See supra note 30.
198. See generally L. RADINOWICZ AND M. WOLFGANG, CRIME AND JUSTICE;
VOLUME II THE CRIMINAL IN THE ARMS OF THE LAW (1977).
199. IND. CODE § 31-6-2-1(d) (1981). See supra note 30.
200. See supra note 198.
201. See supra note 1, 162-64 and accompanying text.
202. See supra note 174 and accompanying text.
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PROPOSED CHANGES OF PUBLIC LAW 266
Public Law 266 confronts many of the serious issues associated
with juvenile waiver. However, its statutory language is flawed. The
problems are not irreparable and more importantly can be rectified
with an amendment to the statute.
Shortcomings of Public Law 266
The statutory language of the exclusionary waiver provision
could lead to consequences not considered by the legislature when
drafting Public Law 266. The exclusionary provision states: ". .. the
court having adult criminal jurisdiction shall retain jurisdiction over
the case, even if the individual pleads guilty to or is convicted of a
lesser included offense.""3 Under this statutory scheme, the plea
bargaining phase becomes crucial. The prosecutor retains the discre-
tionary power to charge the accused juvenile with the offense he
deems appropriate." ' If the juvenile is immediately charged with an
excluded offense, he will remain in the adult system even though he
is convicted of or pleads guilty to a lesser offense. However, the
prosecutor can exercise his discretion to force a plea bargain in
nearly any situation.
By not charging the juvenile with an excluded offense, the prose-
cutor leaves open the possibility of a plea of guilty to a lesser of-
fense and incarceration in a juvenile facility. The juvenile who does
not want to risk confinement in an adult facility will plead guilty to
the lesser offense. For example, if a juvenile sixteen years of age is
charged with sexual assault, he will not automatically be waived to
adult court. The juvenile could plead guilty to the charge and be
placed in a juvenile correctional facility. Now another possibility
could be that the juvenile is charged with rape. The juvenile is auto-
matically waived to adult court jurisdiction. In this court he may be
found guilty not of rape but of the lesser included offense of sexual
assault and be placed in an adult correctional facility on the basis of
the initial charge.
An effective solution to this problem would be to amend the
statute so that it read:
... the court having adult criminal jurisdiction shall retain
jurisdiction over the case only if the individual is convicted
203. IND. CODE § 31-6-2-1(d) (1981). See supra note 30.
204. Cox v. United States, 473 F.2d at 335.
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of one of the crimes listed in clauses (1) through (4) of this
section. If convicted of, or pleads guilty to, a lesser offense,
the individual shall be sentenced to a juvenile correctional
facility until such time as he reaches the age of majority. If
at that time the individual still has not completed his sent-
ence, he shall be transferred to the adult correctional facility
until such time as the sentence is complete.
This amendment would help avoid the problems associated with
sentencing juveniles with adults."5 Other states have enacted
similar statutes to solve this problem.!" An amendment of this
nature would not restrain the aggressive stance Public Law 266
takes against the juvenile accused of a serious offense. This amend-
ment would effectively safeguard the juvenile from the overzealous
prosecutor and protect the youthful offender from confinement with
hardened adult offenders.
An issue Public Law 266 fails to confront is the decrease in
criminal activity of the juvenile offender as he grows older. °7 It has
been shown that for some juvenile offenders, age alone is the cure
for criminality.' Confinement would be detrimental to these indi-
viduals since with or without correctional treatment, these offenders
would not commit another offense. 9
Although this is a significant finding, the Indiana legislature
has not acted upon it by incorporating it in the waiver proceeding.
Arguably, the legislature's failure to address this finding is premised
on the difficulty of identifying those juveniles for whom age along is
the settling force. A response and solution would be not to incarce-
rate any juvenile until after his twenty-first birthday. However, this
would be absurd since over one-half of juveniles offenders are recidi-
vists.21
The appropriate solution is not presently known. Public Law 266
does not provide for this finding in its aggressive stance towards
205. For a discussion of the problems that occur when juveniles are imprisoned
with adults, see generally W. MORRISON, JUVENILE OFFENDERS (1973).
206. Vermont has recently enacted a provision whereby juveniles convicted of
a lesser offense than originally charged, are referred back to the juvenile court for
sentencing in the juvenile correctional system. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33 § 635(a)(h) (1981).
207. Although the percentages and ages differ for each study, they generally
"show that while individual crime rate decreases with age, the severity of official sanc-
tions rise." See Fighting Crime, supra note 177.
208. Id. at 94.
209. Id.
210. See supra note 174.
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the juvenile accused of a serious offense. Until a feasible solution is
proposed, the aggressive stance and the ramifications of Public Law
266 are justified.
Ramifications of Public Law 266
Regardless of the scope of the waiver statute, waiver rarely oc-
curs except for those individuals who are in the last two years of
jurisdiction in the juvenile court and are charged with a serious
felony.21' It is these individuals Public Law 266 excludes from the
jurisdiction of the juvenile court.21 These individuals could have
been waived under the prior statute.13 The 1980 statute allowed a
juvenile, aged sixteen to eighteen, accused of a serious offense to be
judicially waived to the adult court."' In essence, if the juvenile
court was waiving the juvenile accused of a serious offense, Public
Law 266 should only affect the method by which the juvenile would
have been waived. However, if the juvenile court was utilizing its
discretionary power properly, Public Law 266 would not have been
passed. Therefore, arguably the legislature perceived the need to
check excessive judicial discretion.
As indicated, Public Law 266 should not have a drastic effect
on juvenile waiver. Nevertheless, it is important that the legislature
is looking at the juvenile accused of a serious offense as a significant
threat to society. Thus, the juvenile should be tried in a court whose
aim includes protecting society. 1' The direction of future amend-
ments to the juvenile waiver process is necessarily speculative.
However, if Public Law 266 is any indication of the direction of the
legislature, it will most likely be an amendment affecting the
disposition of the juvenile offender."'
CONCLUSION
The issue of serious juvenile crime seems to emphasize the age
of the offender and not the severity of the crime. A murderer,
211. INSTITUTE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION-AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION,
JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS: STANDARDS RELATING TO TRANSFER BETWEEN COURTS 18
(1980).
212. See supra note 30.
213. The 1980 statute allowed waiver for these individuals under a judicial
waiver process. IND. CODE § 31-6-2-4(d) (1980).
214. Id.
215. See supra note 168 and accompanying text.
216. In 1978, 243 juveniles were waived from juvenile to adult court in Indiana.
The ratio of juveniles waived to those not waived is 2.506 / 10,000. Of the juveniles
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rapist, robber, or kidnapper should be treated as a serious offender,
regardless of his age. Public Law 266 provides for this by prosecu-
ting the juvenile accused of a serious offense in adult court.
Many books, journals, articles and notes on this subject con-
spicuously disregard the fact that a serious crime has been commit-
ted. The Indiana legislature, along with the legislatures of other
states which have passed similar waiver provisions, are indicating
its displeasure with the traditional approach of treating the problem
of serious juvenile crime. The traditional philosophy of the juvenile
court is not effectively solving the problems and an alternative must
be attempted.
Waiver is not a determination of guilt. The state must still prove
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and twelve of the accused's peers
must ascertain such guilt. Public Law 266 does not mandate an in-
evitable conviction. Its purpose is to hold the juvenile accused of a
serious offense responsible for his actions.
Perry Carter Rocco
waived, 46.6% were for personal injury offenses, 48.6% were for property offenses,
and 4.7% were for public order offenses (alcohol abuse and drug addiction). Of the 243
cases, 86% were found guilty in adult court, 13% were dismissed, and 1% were found
not guilty. The convictions of juveniles in adult court included:
11 Murders and manslaughters
5 Rapes
48 Burglaries
1 Aggravated assault
2 Assault and batteries
24 Miscellaneous property offenses, such as larceny
16 Miscellaneous personal injury offenses, such as sexual assaults
and weapon offenses
7 Public Orders
The sentences of those convicted ranged from:
19% less than 1 year
14% minimum 1 year - maximum 3 years
36%/o minimum 3 years - maximum 5 years
28o minimum 5 years - maximum 10 years
00/0 over 10 years
HAMPERIAN, ET AL., ACADEMY FOR CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS, YOUTH IN ADULT COURTS:
BETWEEN Two WORLDS (as of yet unpublished). Considering the severity of these of-
fenses and the leniency of the sentences, the most likely addition to the juvenile code
would be a mandatory sentencing policy similar to one enacted in Delaware. DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 10, § 937(c) (Supp. 1980).
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